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Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015)
Kevin Rechkoff
The Ninth Circuit employed Chevron deference in their decision to
confirm BSEE’s approval of Shell’s Oil Spill Response Plans. This holding
represents a potential nail in the coffin for the parties seeking to block offshore
drilling permits. Although the dissent refutes the majority’s interpretation of the
ESA and NEPA consultation processes, this case stands as an example of how
ambiguity in statutory language can have dire consequences on citizens seeking
to enforce harsher environmental standards under an APA challenge.
I. INTRODUCTION
At issue in Alaska Wilderness v. Jewell, was whether the Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE” or “Agency”) had discretionary
authority to consider supplementary factors in its Oil Spill Response Plans
(“OSRP”) review process. 1 In addition, the plaintiffs, comprised of numerous
environmental advocacy groups, objected to the federal agency’s claims that they
were not required to conduct Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) or National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) consultation in their ORSP approval
process.2 The statute that governs the required contents of OSRPs contains two
conflicting sections. 3 In one, six required components of the plans are
enumerated.4 If these requirements are met, the BSEE is mandated to approve the
plan regardless of the plan’s gaps in adherence to other environmental statutes.5
Conversely, the parties seeking approval are also required to construct plans
containing response measures that mitigate the environmental damage to the
“maximum extent practicable.”6 In dealing with this conflict, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the BSEE acted within its
regulatory authority when it decided the mandatory nature of the listed
requirements was controlling in its approval process.7 The plaintiffs, in a losing
effort, claimed the Agency’s approval violated provisions of the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) and the ESA by not conducting necessary NEPA consultation prior to
federal agency action.8 However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating the BSEE
was not required to undertake ESA, CWA, or NEPA review because the Agency
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Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1220.
Id.; see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D) (2012).
Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1220; see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii).
33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii); see Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1215.
Jewell, 788 F.3d at 1223.
Id. at 1219.
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was mandated to approve an OSRP if the statutory requirements had been met.9
Thus, because consultation would have no impact on BSEE’s discretion to
approve or reject the OSRP, the court held it would be unreasonable to require
the Agency to complete the NEPA or ESA process.10
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a series of cases concerning off shore oil and gas development, the
latest decision by the Ninth Circuit comes after a longstanding effort by Shell
Gulf of Mexico, Inc., and Shell Offshore, Inc. (collectively “Shell”), to conduct
offshore drilling operations in Alaskan waters. 11 In 2002, the Mineral
Management Service (“MMS”) established a five-year leasing schedule for
Alaska’s outer continental shelf.12 Between 2005 and 2008, Shell acquired leases
to drill in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.13 Shell then submitted its OSRPs and
exploration plans, with the goal of beginning extraction in 2010. 14 In March
2010, MMS approved both of Shell’s OSRPs.15
Less than one month later, the Deepwater Horizon (“Deepwater”)
catastrophe occurred.16 The explosion, rig sinking, and subsequent release of over
4 million barrels of oil resulted in a moratorium on offshore drilling projects17
and shifted the authority to approve OSRPs from the MMS to the BSEE. 18
Additionally, authority to approve exploration plans transferred from the MMS to
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. 19 From a policy standpoint, the
Department of the Interior (“DOI”) responded to the Deepwater catastrophe by
issuing stricter guidance on the content required to be in the OSRPs. 20 Shell
submitted revised OSRPs in accordance with the new requirements in May 2011
and the beginning of 2012.21 BSEE approved both OSRPs.22
The plaintiffs then sued DOI and the Secretary of the Interior, the parties
overseeing the BSEE, under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), stating
9
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David Barstow, David Rohode, Stephanie Saul, Deepwater Horizon’s Final
Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26
spill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the Bp Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2011).
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that BSEE had approved OSRPs that were inadequate in their response measures,
violating the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA.23 The United States
District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of
the federal agency defendants and intervenor Shell, stating that the BSEE’s
interpretations, and approval of the OSRPs was not unreasonable.24
III. ANALYSIS
A. OSRP Statutory Ambiguity
On appeal, the plaintiffs again argued the BSEE had violated the APA by
acting arbitrarily and capriciously when approving Shell’s OSRPs.25 In particular,
the plaintiffs accused the BSEE of disregarding Shell’s oil spill recovery rate of
ninety-percent, which they considered unreasonable and unsubstantiated.26 In its
review, the Ninth Circuit disagreed that BSEE had relied on Shell’s claims when
approving the OSRP, and held that the plaintiff’s incorrectly interpreted that
language of the OSRP.27
After dismissing the APA components of the plaintiffs argument, the
court stated the approval of the OSRP would only be overturned if the BSEE
relied on authority that Congress “did not intend” to impart upon it when
designing the statute. 28 According to the court, the statute explaining the
requirements of the OSRP was ambiguous both in its language and its
construction.29 The court found the statute’s language ambiguous because it was
silent on BSEE’s discretion to consider “additional environmental factors” in its
review of an OSRP.30
At conflict were two sections of the OSRP statute. 33 U.S.C. §
1321(j)(5)(A)(i) states that owners and operators of drilling platforms are
required to respond to a worst-case scenario spill to the “maximum extent
practicable.” 31 Under this language, BSEE has discretion to determine if the
OSRP has provided enough evidence that the owner or operator will be able to
respond fully to a worst-case scenario. 32 The other subpart of the statute, 33
U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D), provides a list of requirements for OSRPs, and states
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Id. at 1217; see Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
Jewell, 788 F.3d.at 1217.
Id. at 1218.
Id.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1217 (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir.

2008)).
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Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id. at 1220 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)).
Id. at 1220.
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unequivocally that, if met, the agency must approve the OSRP.33 In response to
this contradiction, the BSEE determined that the enumerated requirements and its
mandate to approve, if satisfied, removed all agency discretion to review if the
OSRP met the “maximum extent practicable” threshold.34
In its review, the court held it was appropriate to grant an agency’s
statutory interpretation Chevron deference when conflicting language created
ambiguity. 35 Additionally, the court stated when statutory language presents
uncertainty as to the appropriate construction of a statute, agency interpretation
should prevail “unless it is unreasonable.” 36 The BSEE argued that the
“maximum extent practicable” section was merely an instruction to issue
regulations that delineate how operators can comply with statutory checklist
requirements. 37 Therefore, the BSEE read the statutory language of §
1321(j)(5)(D) as a restriction on its discretionary authority.38 The court held this
interpretation was reasonable in light of the Agency’s review of Shell’s OSRP,
and thus the plaintiffs’ challenge failed to demonstrate evidence that the BSEE’s
interpretation exceeded or fell short of its statutory obligations.39
B. Impact of Ambiguity and Interpretation on Consultation
The plaintiffs further argued that BSEE was required to engage in ESA
consultation prior to approving the OSRPs, and that failure to complete an
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was a violation of NEPA.40 Thus, the
plaintiffs argued that the EIS was required to ensure minimal impact on species
affected by a worst-case discharge.41 However, the court disagreed, holding that
the statutory requirements of the ESA could not defeat an agency’s nondiscretionary authority to implement a statute they have been charged with
administering.42 In other words, the court found that an agency directly in charge
of administering a statute couldn’t expand its implementation authority due to the
language of an alternative statute.43 Therefore, the court held that the process of
determining if the requirements of § 1321(j)(5)(D) have been met does not
trigger consultation under the ESA.44 Furthermore, because BSEE must approve
33
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the OSRP if all requirements have been met, the court held completing an EIS
under NEPA was not required because it would serve no purpose due to the
mandatory nature of the language in § 1321(j)(5)(D).45
C. Dissenting Opinion
In contrast, the dissent contended the BSEE was required to conduct
ESA and NEPA consultation, stating that because the Agency had the ability to
take measures to protect endangered species, it was required to undergo the ESA
consultation process before approving an OSRP.46 The dissent agreed with the
majority that the BSEE was required to follow the mandatory nature of the OSRP
statutory language and approve the plan if the six requirements listed were met.47
However, the dissent stated that the BSEE did not have the authority to ignore
the mandates of coexisting environmental statutes if the OSRP could be revised
or improved to mitigate the impact on environmentally sensitive populations or
ecosystems. 48 This interpretation of NEPA, the ESA, and the CWA was not
persuasive to the majority.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court’s holding in Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell demonstrates
the power of Chevron deference. By affirming the BSEE’s interpretation as
reasonable, the court has promulgated a narrow rule and granted a federal agency
the authority to disregard the requirements of parallel environmental statutes in
favor of the statute they are in charge of overseeing. In essence, the court made it
clear that a federal agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, unless it is
unreasonable, holds ultimate authority on the issue. The majority’s statement that
consultation requirements set forth by the ESA and NEPA are in some cases
unnecessary has the potential to be an argument raised and debated in similar
cases. The necessity of the ESA and NEPA consultation process will be an
interesting legal battleground in the future, as parties seeking to drill for oil in
America’s offshore reserves will likely use this decision to avoid certain
requirements of those statutes.
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Id. at 1227 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

